[mnet-devel] Grid Of Trust -- pre-design

[Some Guy]

 --- Jim Dixon <jdd at dixons.org> wrote: 
> On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, [iso-8859-1] Some Guy wrote:

> > The only thing I see you limiting him by his his number of IPs.  Is
> > that you're whold big argument:"let's use IPs as a limit instead of
> > CPU or drive space"?
> 
> My real argument is that the big flat p2p networks that were proposed
> around 1999-2001 are sitting ducks, easy targets for adversaries with any
> resources. The next generation of p2p systems must be small, fluid, hard
> to hit.  In military terms, the old-style networks are like Saddam
> Hussain's big, soft, clumsy army.  New network architectures must be more
> like al Quaida, built around personal trust.  They should be easy to
> build, so that you think nothing of throwing them away.  They should
> expect and react gracefully to attacks, fragmenting if necessary.  They
> should be modular, so that if a better way of solving problems comes
> along, you can just plug it in.  All of this makes it difficult for an
> adversary to see them, let alone take action against them.

I see things going 1 of 2 ways.  A large efficient network, built like a phalanx.  Where we all
stand together.  This type of a network needs to be so damn useful that like the Internet they
won't try to outlaw it.

Or a friend linked network, working a bit less efficiently, built like an insurgency.  This is my
second choice.

Either way you can make a global DHT, but you have to have some way of dividing up responsiblity
randomly.
 
 
> > > > If you've got some better idea to randomly assign nodes jobs, feel
> > > > free to suggest.
> >
> > > Cluster of N authentication servers using a Byzantine protocol.
> > > Initially set up by acquaintances.  Other people can choose to use the
> > > cluster.  If and when its reputation is compromised, they can set up their
> > > own clusters.  Some clusters will become well known, trusted, and very
> > > large, providing excellent cover for those seeking anonymity.
> > >
> > > There will be many clusters, most quite small.  That is, there will be a
> > > crowd of clusters, providing excellent cover for those seeking anonymity.
> >
> > So how do I know which cluster has what part of a global DHT?  Does it
> > tell us and we trust it?  Are you still tring to build a global DHT,
> > or is this a solution for some other problem?
> 
> But I have _never_ suggested building a global DHT.  What I have suggested
> is designing an infrastructure that can be used to implement p2p networks
> of all sizes, using a variety of techniques.

Ahhhhhh, well I am out to build a global DHT and a global premix.  United it can stand divided
it'll get killed.  Sure you and a dozen friends can all authenticate each other and make a 12 man
DHT, it'll be 12 times as resistant to DoS, but if you're worried about the jerk with 2^14 CPUs
lieing around I'm not sure what the points is.

> The large clusters, of course, will doubtless be global DHTs.  But they
> will overlap, with many people belonging to more than one cluster - and
> casually copying data from one to another.
> 
> If the objective is anonymity, this is how to attain it.

In order to get anonymity you're going to have to mix with people you don't know.  If it's only
you and your 11 friends you're only 1/12th anonymous.

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